

Pramana – means of knowledge in Indian Thought.

Patanjali Yoga Sutras Part I:

6. These five kinds of thought-waves are: right knowledge, wrong knowledge, verbal delusion, sleep, and memory
7. The right kinds of knowledge are: direct perception, inference, and scriptural testimony
8. Wrong knowledge is knowledge which is false and not based upon the true nature of its object
9. Verbal delusion arises when words do not correspond with reality
10. Sleep is a wave of thought about nothingness
11. Memory is when perceived objects are not forgotten, but come back to consciousness

Refs: Grimes – Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy
and Eugene Halliday

Pramana - Skrt. – 'means of valid knowledge' ; logical proof; means of cognition (from the verb root ma = "to measure" and pra = "before or forward") – The pr is the Gk 'pi ratio' – relation of centre to periphery.

Pramana Definitions, cognisant and clarifying Sanskrit terms, and Indian Schools of Thought with their "limits of application" for the terms:-

1.

It is the instrument (karana) of valid knowledge. As the cause, so the effect (manadhinameyasiddhih). According to each system, the number of pramanas accepted as valid will depend upon **the types of knowledge that are recognised.**

2.

Indian Schools of Thought and their allowances for the means of valid knowledge are as follows:-

- a. The Carvaka (Materialist) school accepts perception (pratyaksa) as the only means of valid knowledge.
- b. The Buddhists and Vaisesika accept perception and inference (anumana).
- c. The Jainas, Sankhya, Yoga, Visistadvaita Vedanta, and Dvaita Vedanta accept perception, inference, and verbal testimony (sabda). Verbal testimony is often translated as "authority". Christ in the Bible is caused to be "one having authority". Author – one who works it out in his 'own' substance. The Sanskrit 'au' is the Self, the 'thor' is the hierarchical power rotation.
- d. Nyaya accepts perception, inference, verbal testimony, and comparison (upamana).
- e. The Prabhakara Mimamsa school accepts perception, inference, verbal testimony, comparison, and presumption (arthapatti).
- f. The Bhatta Mimamsa and Advaita accept perception, inference, verbal testimony, comparison, presumption, and noncognition (anupalabधि).
- g. Saiva Siddhanta accepts Siva-cit-sakti as the only valid means of knowledge, though, as secondary means, it accepts the traditional first three pramanas.
- h. Dvaita Vedanta calls the sources of valid knowledge as anu-pramana; kevala-pramana is defined as the knowledge of an object as it is.
- i. Dvaita recognises perception, inference, and verbal testimony as anu-pramana.

3.

According to Jainism, the means of valid knowledge is knowledge of a thing as it is. It is direct (aparoksa), and indirect (paroksa).

Direct is either practical (vyavaharika) or otherworldly (paramarthika).

Practical is either perceptual knowledge (mati) or verbal (srta).

Otherworldly is either direct knowledge (kevala) or indirect (vikala).

Indirect is of five types smrti, pratyabhijna, tarka, anumana, and agama.

4.

According to some traditions, inclusion (sambhava), tradition (aitihya), parisesa (supplement or remainder), and ceta (gesticulation) are pramanas.

5.

Socrates allowed 'conjecture'. Conject – 'throw together'. Indian thinkers disallowed this.

6 Schools of Philosophy in India

1. Samkhya
2. Yoga
3. Vedanta
4. Nyaya
5. Vaisesika
6. Mimamsa

Kahmir Saivism